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Abstract 
Candidates for public office are part of the politically ‘active minority’ that serve as a fundamental link between 
voters and the ruling class. The selection of candidates can also define the traits of political personnel in the 
major political institutions and, more in general, the very nature of democratic representation. The study of can-
didates is particularly interesting in the case of the 2018 Italian elections as it allows us to understand the extent 
to which Italian citizens are willing to run for office despite a negative climate towards politics, and despite parties’ 
choices under the new mixed electoral system – the so-called ‘Rosato law’. This article investigates a number of 
key characteristics of the Italian candidates running for a seat in the Chamber of Deputies in 2018 and compares 
them with those who stood for office in the past elections from 1976 onwards. In particular, we focus on the 
following aspects: the overall number of candidacies and party lists, the use of multiple candidacies by different 
parties, and some relevant traits of candidates such as their age, gender and past experience as candidates. 
Results highlight the impact of the new electoral institutions, as in 2018 the overall number of Italian candidates 
and lists has decreased if compared to the 2013 elections. However, the new rules have not substantially re-
duced the number of those who run for office without any reasonable possibility of obtaining a parliamentary 
seat. In addition, the population of Italian would-be deputies has become more balanced in terms of gender – 
though not any younger – and the turnover rate among Italian candidates seems to be somewhat lower than in 
2013. Furthermore, moving from 2013 to 2018, the leaders of Italian parties have made more moderate use of 
multiple candidacies as a tool for controlling party members. In the last elections, multiple candidacies were 
employed mostly for safeguarding the election of some prominent politicians. 
1. Introduction 
andidate selection received extensive attention during the campaign preceding 
Italy’s 2018 general elections. This is unsurprising, as the identity of candidates 
for parliament and the way in which they are selected are considered by most 
commentators to be newsworthy. First of all, candidates are part of what we could label a 
politically ‘active minority’ in society – i.e., those citizens whose level of political partic-
ipation is neither simply restricted to a periodic act of voting, nor equals that of active 
party supporters or party members. In this sense, candidates for elective offices serve as 
a fundamental link between voters and the ruling class and are part of what, about a cen-
tury ago, Gaetano Mosca (1982: 1015) defined as the ‘second stratum’ of the political 
class. Candidates’ social and intellectual profiles provide an insightful view of the link-
age connecting society at large with the political realm. In addition, the recruitment of 
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candidates is ‘the secret garden’ (Gallagher and Marsh 1988) of any party democracy, as 
the outcome of the selection process can affect the traits of political personnel in the ma-
jor legislative and executive institutions and, more in general, can define the very nature 
of democratic representation (Di Virgilio and Segatti 2016). Parties are the gatekeepers 
of that garden and the electoral system is the context defining the incentives for the gate-
keeping role parties have.  
If, then, candidacies are always an important topic in any study of nation-wide elec-
tions, they should be extremely interesting in the case of the 2018 Italian elections, in 
particular for two reasons. On the one hand, analysing candidates allows us to under-
stand the extent to which Italian citizens are willing to participate in politics by running 
for office, and to identify the would-be representatives (at least in terms of some basic 
traits such as age and gender). This is especially interesting in the current phase, which 
in many accounts appears to be a turning point in national history: evaluations of parties 
and political institutions are starkly negative in public opinion, but new parties seem to 
be a venue for novel political mobilisation. On the other hand, the new mixed electoral 
system (the so-called ‘Rosato law’) provides parties with new incentives to fulfil their 
role as gatekeepers. 
This article aims to analyse several key characteristics of the candidates running in 
the 2018 Italian general elections and compares the 2018 candidates with those who 
stood for office in past Italian elections from 1976 onwards. In so doing, we concentrate 
on the candidates for a seat in the lower house of the Italian Parliament (the Chamber of 
Deputies), for which data are available for a longer time period. In particular, we expect 
that the new electoral system has affected candidacies in 2018 with regard to three main 
aspects. The first is the overall number of candidates, which can be considered as a proxy 
of Italian citizens’ willingness to participate in politics, in spite of a popular climate that 
is negative towards politics. Has the Rosato law increased or decreased the size of the ac-
tive minority of the Italian population? The second relates to multiple candidacies. Is 
there any variation in the use of multiple candidacies among parties? And what are the 
differences from the past? The third concerns some key traits of candidates such as their 
age, gender and past experience as candidates. How have the new electoral incentives 
affected the recruitment choices made by party leaders? 
The article is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the main features 
of the electoral system that can affect the choice of candidates. The third section presents 
a longitudinal analysis of the number of party lists and candidates that have participated 
in general elections in Italy over the 1976-2018 period. In the fourth section we concen-
trate on the 2018 election and analyse how party leaders made use of multiple 
candidacies. The fifth section deals with the age and gender of Italian would-be represent-
atives. Moreover, we assess the degree of renewal of the population of candidates in Italy. 
The last section concludes and discusses some possible avenues for future research. 
2. The new electoral system 
Providing a full account of the new electoral system is clearly outside the scope of the 
present article. However, it is worth highlighting some peculiarities of the new electoral 
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rules that can be hypothesized to substantially affect the process of candidate selection.1 
One of these key features is the mixed nature of the new electoral system, whereby 37% 
of legislative seats (232 out of 630 in the Chamber of Deputies, 116 out of 315 in the Sen-
ate) are assigned by plurality and 61% of seats (386 and 193, respectively) are allocated 
through PR in multi-member constituencies. In each chamber, the remaining 2% of 
seats are elected by Italian voters living abroad. Although largely based on a proportional 
principle, the new electoral system could be expected to limit the number of party lists 
participating in the elections as well as the number of parties actually entering Parlia-
ment. This is mostly because the presence of a plurality tier should drive parties to 
coordinate and build electoral alliances in order to present common candidates in each 
single-member district.2 
A second element which shaped parties’ decisions concerning candidacies is re-
lated to the representation threshold established by the new electoral law. According to 
the previous Italian electoral system (the ‘Calderoli law’), parties could enter Parliament 
only if they achieved at least 2% of votes (if part of an electoral coalition) or 4% of votes (if 
they ran alone). Moreover, thanks to the so-called ‘best loser’ clause, also the largest co-
alesced party below the threshold was entitled to enter Parliament. The Rosato law 
establishes instead a single threshold that corresponds to 3% of votes for both coalesced 
and non-coalesced parties. As a consequence, under the new rules, the best way in which 
the leaders of minor parties can win a legislative seat is by participating in an electoral 
alliance with larger parties and negotiating with them the possibility of running as can-
didates in a supposedly safe single-member district. On the whole, we expect that the 
new threshold might reduce the number of electoral lists compared to 2013. 
Third, multiple candidacies are still allowed by the new rules. In particular, the 
same candidate can run for office in a single-member district and, at the same time, can 
be included in a party list in up to five multi-member constituencies. Although multiple 
candidacies were allowed also by the previous electoral system, in 2018 they seem to have 
been used by party leaders also as an instrument for securing the election of prominent 
members of the party (see below). Indeed, several well-known politicians who ran in a 
single-member district managed to win a seat only because, while defeated in the dis-
trict, they had also been nominated at the top of their party’s list in one or more 
constituencies in the PR tier. By the same token, the inclusion of high-ranking politi-
cians at the top of (short) party lists forced party leaders to make hard choices between 
potential candidates, thus excluding some eminent members of the party. 
Fourth, the Rosato law features a set of provisions aimed at balancing the presence 
of men and women in the Italian Parliament. More precisely, party lists in multi-mem-
ber constituencies must be filled in such a way that each candidate cannot be followed by 
a candidate of the same gender. Moreover, neither male candidates nor female 
                                                             
1See Pedrazzani and Pinto (2015) for a review of studies of how electoral rules can be expected to shape 
the selection of candidates and their behaviour. 
2As for the PR part of the new electoral system, the relatively small magnitude of multi-member constit-
uencies (about 4) might be in principle expected to reduce the fragmentation in the electoral supply 
(Carey and Hix 2011; Cox 1997). However, it should be taken into account that such a hypothesized effect 
on fragmentation is moderated by the provision of a top-down seating allocation system: the percentage 
considered for the allocation of seats is not calculated in the single multi-member constituency, but on 
the basis of the votes obtained by party lists at the national level (for the election of the Chamber of Dep-
uties) or at the regional level (for the election of the Senate). 
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candidates from the same party can be at the top of the list in more than 60% of the multi-
member constituencies. Similarly, for any party neither gender can be present in single-
member districts more than 60% of the times. 
A further aspect that received considerable media attention before the vote concerns 
the formal requirements that parties had to fulfil in order to participate to the elections. 
Indeed, the rules that applied to newcomers are substantially different from those that 
applied to the parties that were already in Parliament at the end of the 17thLegislature 
(2013-2018). While incumbent parties were exempted from collecting signatures, a new 
party that wanted to run in the whole country had to collect a minimum of 20,000 signa-
tures. Moreover, it had to present lists in at least two-thirds of the multi-member 
constituencies in a region.3 Although the required number of signatures was certainly ac-
cessible, new parties had a relatively short time period for collecting them: the deadline 
for presenting the collected signatures was on 29 January 2018, one month after the day 
in which the President of the Republic Sergio Mattarella dissolved Parliament (28 De-
cember 2017). Such rules hindered the participation of several small parties that were not 
already in Parliament, while favouring some minor groups that were in Parliament dur-
ing the 17th Legislature. In this respect, a particularly illuminating example is +Europa, a 
new party headed by Emma Bonino. This party was encountering difficulties in collecting 
the required number of signatures and was eventually able to participate in the 2018 elec-
tions only when Bruno Tabacci ‘offered’ the symbol of his party (Centro Democratico, 
CD), which was already present in Parliament, to Bonino’s list. 
Finally, the general elections of March 2018 were the first in which Italian parties 
were not entitled to receive any refund from the state for the expenses sustained during 
their electoral campaign. The so-called ‘electoral refunds’ were introduced in 1999 as a 
‘disguised’ form of public financing of parties, and regarded any party achieving at least 
4% of votes in the general elections. This relatively low threshold, which was subse-
quently lowered to 1% and then raised to 2% in 2012, had allowed many minor parties to 
obtain public funds. A law cutting electoral refunds was enacted in 2014, and public re-
funds were totally abolished from 2017 onward. The absence of electoral refunds 
increased the costs of participation in 2018, especially for smaller parties. 
Our goal is, then, to assess how these provisions affected candidacies in the 2018 
elections. Has the new system increased or decreased the size of the active minority of 
the Italian population that is willing to run for parliamentary office? How have party 
leaders made use of multiple candidacies? Have the new rules increased the presence of 
women in the Italian Parliament? Have they contributed to a renewal of candidacies in 
general? 
3. Candidates and party lists in Italy: a longitudinal analysis 
A first element that is worth emphasizing concerning candidacies in Italy is the rela-
tively high number of those who run for office at election time. In March 2018, as many 
as 5,058 candidates grouped in 28 party lists were in the running for the election of the 
Italian Chamber of Deputies. As illustrated in Table 1, in absolute terms this figure is 
                                                             
3 According to the Rosato law, the whole territory of Italy is divided into 27 broad regional constituencies, 
and each of these is divided into a number of multi-member constituencies. 
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higher than the number of candidates in any other European country. According to the 
reported data, which are taken from the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS), the num-
ber of candidates for the lower chamber was slightly above 4,000 in Austria (2008) and 
the United Kingdom (2010).4 Those who stood as candidates in the general elections 
were about 3,900 in Sweden (2014) and Switzerland (2015), and 2,700 in Germany 
(2013). In other terms, the absolute number of candidates in Italy is higher than in those 
European countries that adopt a pure PR system, as well as in the UK where a plurality 
system is in place. Also, the number of Italian candidates is about twice the number of 
candidates in Germany, where a mixed electoral system is in place. Of course, the num-
ber of candidates fielded by parties also depends on the overall number of legislative 
seats that are at stake, as well as on the type of electoral system. If we divide the number 
of candidates by the number of available seats, we can note that the number of candidates 
per seats in Italy 2018 is clearly below that observed in purely PR systems like Austria 
and Switzerland. However, this does not disprove our findings about the huge volume of 
Italian citizens that are willing to stand as candidates. How can we then account for such 
a marked propensity to run for public office in Italy? And to what extent may this be re-
lated to institutional factors, i.e. the characteristics of the electoral system? 
Table 1. Number of candidates for the lower or only chamber in European democracies 
Country Year Number of candidates Candidates per seat 
Austria 2008 4,080 22.30 
Denmark 2011 784 4.38 
Estonia 2011 789 7.81 
Finland 2011 2,315 11.58 
Germany 2013 2,776* 4.41* 
Greece 2015 1,384* 4.61* 
Hungary 2014 840* 4.22* 
Iceland 2009 756* 12* 
Ireland 2007 466 2.95 
Italy 2018 5,058 (1,957*) 8.18 (3.17*) 
Netherlands 2006 489 3.26 
Norway 2009 1,972* 11.67* 
Portugal 2011 1,150* 5.00* 
Romania 2016 1,928* 5.86* 
Sweden 2014 3,888 11.14 
Switzerland 2015 3,873 19.36 
United Kingdom 2010 4,042 6.21 
Notes: Data are taken from the Comparative Candidate Survey, Module I and II (http://www.comparativecandidates.org/). 
For more details, see Di Virgilio and Segatti (2016). 
* Data refer to all the candidates of the parties represented in the lower house, and not to the entire universe. For Italy both the 
data are provided. 
                                                             
4 These data are taken from Module 1 and 2 of the CCS. More recent data about candidates in several Eu-
ropean countries cannot be discussed as comprehensive data from Module 2 are not yet available. 
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The choice of entering the electoral arena can be understood as a strategic decision 
where those who are thinking of becoming a candidate weigh up the expected costs and 
benefits deriving from creating a party list and running for public office (Cox 1997; Hug 
2001; Tavits 2006). In this calculation, benefits and costs are prominently determined 
by key aspects of the electoral rules. More precisely, benefits are the payoffs expected 
from winning a certain number of legislative seats and depend on the chance that the 
party list gains enough votes to see some of its members elected to Parliament. Such a 
chance is in turn conditional on the electoral norms adopted in a given country. Costs 
are related to the formal requirements that have to be met in order to participate in the 
electoral competition – that is, the collection of a certain number of signatures and pos-
sible monetary payments. The higher the costs, the greater are the resources that 
potential candidates have to spend. Costs can be lower when party lists have access to 
public funds dispensed by the state as a way of sustaining parties’ electoral campaigns. 
As for the 2018 Italian election, we can argue that, compared to the electoral rules in 
place in 2013, the Rosato law has raised the costs and reduced the expected benefits of 
participating in the electoral competition. Generally speaking, in 2018 costs were higher 
than in the previous election because of the new rules concerning signature require-
ments and the abolishment of electoral refunds. Newcomers were indeed discouraged 
from participation. At the same time, the new representation threshold has reduced 
small parties’ chances of entering Parliament. It does not come as a surprise, then, that 
from 2013 to 2018 both the number of lists and individual candidates have markedly de-
creased. Party lists amounted to 47 in 2013, while being just 28 five years later. Likewise, 
candidates for the Chamber of Deputies have declined from 9,897 to 5,058. 
The impact of the new Italian electoral system can, however, be better understood 
by comparing 2018 data with a longer time period. For this purpose, Figure 1 graphically 
illustrates the trends in the number of lists and candidates per election over the last four 
decades. As stated above, only candidates and lists presented for election of the Chamber 
of Deputies are considered. The 1976-2018 period covers elections regulated by several 
electoral systems. In particular, a PR system with open lists was in place until 1993, a 
mixed member majoritarian system (the Mattarella law) was used in the elections of 
1994, 1996 and 2001, a PR system with majority bonus (the Calderoli law) was adopted 
for the elections of 2006, 2008 and 2013, and finally a new mixed system was established 
by the Rosato law in 2018.5 As the black solid line in the right panel of Figure 1 shows, the 
number of candidates for the Italian Chamber has almost always been greater than 
5,000. There were more than 5,500 would-be deputies in 1976, about 6,500 in the 1979-
1983 elections, and slightly fewer than 8,000 in 1987. The number of candidates reached 
an approximate total of 9,000 in 1992, when the last parliamentary elections of the so-
called Italian First Republic took place. Roughly the same figures were observed in the 
elections under the Calderoli law: the candidates for the Chamber numbered more than 
8,500 in 2006, about 6,000 in 2008 and as many as 10,000 in 2013. The number of can-
didates was significantly smaller in the 1994-2001 years, when a mixed member 
majoritarian system was in place. According to the Mattarella law, 75% of the seats (475 
                                                             
5 Our analysis does not consider the ‘Italicum’ electoral system (PR with majority bonus and possibility 
of run-off between the two most voted party lists), which was approved by the Italian Parliament in 2015 
but has never been used in any election. 
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over 630 in the Chamber) were allocated by plurality in single-member districts, and 25% 
of seats (155) were assigned through PR in 27 multi-member constituencies. In the three 
elections held under this system, the number of candidates was very low, remaining be-
tween 2,000 and 2,500. This is because Italian parties faced strong incentives to 
coordinate and form pre-electoral coalitions to run in single-member districts (Di Vir-
gilio 2002). As the right panel of Figure 1 shows, the mixed nature of the current Italian 
electoral system has had some effect in reducing the number of candidates. Its impact is, 
however, weaker than the impact of the Mattarella law, which is probably due to the 
smaller size of the plurality quota in the new electoral system. 
Figure 1. Number of candidates for the lower or only chamber in European democracies 
 
Notes: Data cover only candidates for the Chamber of Deputies. With regard to the elections of 1994, 1996, 2001 and 
2018, the number of party lists and the number of candidates in lists with at least one elected MP were calculated by 
considering only the PR tier of the electoral system. Multiple candidacies are counted just once. Italian candidates running 
in the abroad constituency are excluded. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration using data taken from the website of the Ministry of Interior. 
A similar trend can be observed if we consider the number of lists presented at the 
time of general elections. The solid black line in the left panel of Figure 1 shows that the 
historically minimum number of lists for the Chamber was recorded when the Mat-
tarella law was in place (just 18 lists in 1996), while the two maximum peaks were 
reached under PR systems: 50 lists in 1992 and 47 lists in 2013. 
The dotted lines in Figure 1 correspond to the number of party lists that obtained at 
least one seat in the Chamber (left panel) and the number of candidates included in 
those lists (right panel). The number of lists that were able to enter Parliament increased 
during the last period of the First Republic, thus signalling the growing fragmentation of 
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the party system that had been established in Italy soon after the Second World War. The 
same occurred with the number of candidates included in lists with at least one seat. The 
trend was interrupted by the adoption of the mixed member majoritarian system in 
1994. In 1994 and 1996 we observe the historically minimum number of lists obtaining 
representation in the Chamber (5). The party lists that entered the Chamber increased 
again in number with the Calderoli PR system, although not reaching the same figures 
of the last period of the First Republic. Under the Rosato law, just seven lists have been 
able to obtain a seat in the Chamber – the same value recorded in 1996 and 2008. The 
seven parties that have achieved representation in 2018 constitute 25% of the total lists 
that participated in the election. 
As the right panel of Figure 1 illustrates, in 2018 about 3,700 candidates (out of a 
total of 5,058) were members of lists that have not gained representation. This value is 
remarkable and is not so distant from those observed in the two previous elections (about 
3,100 in 2008 and 4,800 in 2013). The huge volume of would-be deputies who run for 
office in lists that do not enter the Italian Parliament seems to suggest that simplistic 
rational accounts, where the choice of running as a candidate depends on institutionally 
determined benefits and costs as well as on the probability of success, do not fully ac-
count for candidates’ individual decisions. There are indeed a variety of further 
motivations that could be added to the picture in order to better explain Italian candi-
dates’ decisions. Among these are attempts to build a personal reputation as a loyal 
member of the party or as a prominent personality in a given geographical territory 
(Pedrazzani, Pinto and Segatti 2016; Pinto 2016). 
4. The use of multiple candidacies 
So far, we have talked about candidacies, presuming that each individual candidate runs 
for office in a particular election and therefore presents her/his own candidacy in a given 
territorial constituency. However, some candidates – the so-called ‘multi-candidates’ – 
play their cards in more than one electoral arena. The Italian electoral system allows the 
same candidate to run in a plurality district and in up to five multi-member constituen-
cies. Let us note that the possibility of multiple candidacies is not new to electoral 
competition in Italy, as they have been admitted by all the electoral rules adopted by the 
Italian Republic. The PR system that was in place over the entire First Republic allowed 
candidates to run in up to three multi-member constituencies. However, the same sys-
tem enabled voters to cast preferences for candidates in open party lists, which seriously 
hindered any strategic use of multiple candidacies by party leaders.  
Multiple candidacies were allowed also under the mixed member majoritarian sys-
tem employed for the 1994, 1996 and 2001 elections. A candidate for a seat in the 
Chamber could appear in her/his party list in up to three multi-member constituencies. 
Remarkably, the same candidate could run both in the proportional tier and in the plu-
rality tier. In 2005, the enactment of the Calderoli law eliminated any limit in the 
number of multiple candidacies: a candidate could appear in her/his party list in every 
multi-member constituency at the same time. This provision transformed multiple can-
didacies into a powerful instrument in the hands of party leaders, who could design the 
(blocked) lists of their party in such a way as to favour the election of those candidates 
who were most loyal to the leader. This is because multiple candidacies create a pool of 
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vacant parliamentary seats, whose allocation depends mostly on party leaders’ choices. 
This phenomenon was so relevant that in the 2006 elections, 40 candidates were elected 
in more than one constituency, thus controlling as many as 261 seats in the Chamber. In 
2008, 19 deputies elected in more than one constituency controlled 137 seats (Pinto 
2017).6 These candidates, who turn out to be simultaneously elected in more than one 
constituency, have to choose just one of them. As a consequence, a pool of seats remains 
vacant and will be assigned to the first among those candidates in the party list who were 
initially not elected. In other terms, multiple candidacies increase the centralization of 
the candidate selection process, granting leaders greater post-election influence: once in 
Parliament, those legislators whose parliamentary office depends mostly on the leaders’ 
choices will be particularly unlikely to vote against party line, as shown by analysing the 
records of roll-call votes in the Italian Parliament (Pinto 2017). 
These considerations lead us to examine how multiple candidacies have been used 
by Italian parties in the general elections of 2018.How many multi-candidates were there 
in the last election? And which combinations of multiple candidacies were used most? 
Tables 2 and 3 report these types of data for the electoral coalitions running in single-
member districts and for all the parties that passed the 3% threshold for obtaining repre-
sentation in the Chamber.  
Table 2. Distribution of candidates across single- and multi-member constituencies by coalition and 
party list (%) 
Constituency 
Centre-right Centre-left 
LEU M5S FI+FDI+LEGA+Others PD+Others 
Only multi-member 70.81 65.53 36.39 45.41 
Only single-member 13.77 17.29 44.50 41.18 
Both 15.42 17.18 19.11 13.41 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Notes: Data cover only candidates for the Chamber of Deputies. Candidates in single-member constituencies supported 
by a coalition of parties are classified under ‘centre-left’ or ‘centre-right’ labels. 
Party acronyms: Forza Italia (FI, Go Italy), Fratelli d’Italia (FDI, Brothers of Italy), Lega (League, former Northern League), Liberi e 
Uguali (LEU, Free and Equal), Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S, Five Star Movement), Partito Democratico (PD, Democratic Party). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration using data taken from the website of the Ministry of Interior. 
Table 2 provides information about the distribution of candidacies across the two 
tiers of the new electoral system, i.e. single- and multi-member constituencies. Liberi e 
Uguali (LEU, Free and Equal) was the party that most used the possibility to nominate 
candidates both in single- and multi-member constituencies. LEU was also the party 
with the highest number of candidates running only in one single-member constitu-
ency. The latter choice possibly cost re-election for many prominent politicians, such as 
Massimo D’Alema, former leader of PD and co-founder of LEU, who ranked last in the 
                                                             
6 In 2013, the larger parties intentionally chose to moderate the use of multiple candidacies for two main 
reasons. The first was to counter the popular argument that the members of the Italian Parliament were 
largely nominated by party leaders, rather than directly elected by people. Second, several parties such as 
Partito Democratico (PD, Democratic Party), Sinistra Ecologia Libertà (SEL, Left Ecology Freedom) and 
Movimento 5 stelle (Five Star Movement, M5S) organized primary elections for selecting their candi-
dates (Di Gregorio and De Vitis 2013). 
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district where he ran. Conversely, centre-left and centre-right coalitions present the 
lowest proportion of candidates running only in single-member constituencies. How-
ever, these figures depend mostly on the fact that single-member candidates of the two 
main electoral alliances are the result of a process of coordination between the parties 
forming them. For this reason, it is probably better to exclude from the analysis the can-
didates running only in single-member districts and concentrate on those competing in 
multi-member constituencies, as in Table 3, for whom it is possible to identify with pre-
cision to which party list they belong.7 
Table 3. Multiple candidacies by party (%) 
Formula FI FDI Lega LEU M5S PD 
1+0 77.00 84.24 76.85 65.57 77.20 75.56 
1+1 10.33 3.94 8.87 24.06 22.80 19.11 
2+0 6.10 4.93 6.40 4.72 0.00 1.78 
2+1 2.82 1.97 3.45 1.42 0.00 0.89 
3+0 0.94 0.00 0.49 0.47 0.00 0.89 
3+1 2.35 0.99 0.49 0.94 0.00 0.00 
4+0 0.00 0.99 0.99 0.47 0.00 0.00 
4+1 0.00 0.49 1.48 1.89 0.00 0.44 
5+0 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5+1 0.47 1.97 0.99 0.47 0.00 1.33 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Notes: Data cover only candidates for the Chamber of Deputies. In the first column reporting the possible combinations 
of multiple candidacies, the number on the left indicates the number of multi-member constituencies where a candidate 
ran, while the number on the right indicates whether or not a candidate stood in a single-member district. For instance, 
2+1 refers to the percentage of candidates from the party who ran as candidates in two multi-member constituencies 
and at the same time as candidates in a plurality district. For each party (column), percentages are calculated considering 
only those candidates who were present in multi-member constituencies. Candidates who only ran in a single-member 
district are not considered. 
Party acronyms: Forza Italia (FI, Go Italy), Fratelli d’Italia (FDI, Brothers of Italy), Lega (League, former Northern League), Liberi e 
Uguali (LEU, Free and Equal), Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S, Five Star Movement), Partito Democratico (PD, Democratic Party). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration using data taken from the website of the Ministry of Interior. 
Each row of Table 3 corresponds to a possible combination of multiple candidacies 
for a candidate whose name was present at least in a multi-member constituency: being 
a candidate only in a multi-member constituency (1+0), being a candidate both in a 
multi-member constituency and in a single-member district (1+1), being a candidate in 
two multi-member constituencies (2+0), being a candidate in two multi-member con-
stituencies and at the same time in a single-member district (2+1), and so on. The most 
‘extreme’ formula is when a candidate appears in five multi-member constituencies and 
at the same time in a single-member district (5+1). As shown in the table, the right-wing 
Fratelli d’Italia (FDI, Brothers of Italy) is the party that made the least extensive use of 
multiple candidacies in 2018: about 84% of those who ran in multi-member 
                                                             
7 Quite interestingly, some recent analyses of the 2018 elections show a very limited degree of ‘personal-
ized’ vote. Only about 1,200,000 Italian voters cast their vote just for a candidate in a single-member 
district – and not for any specific party list associated with that candidate (Fruncillo and Giannatiempo 
2018). 
WHO’S THE WINNER? AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2018 ITALIAN GENERAL ELECTION 
 29 
constituencies under the FDI label stood as candidates only in one constituency. LEU 
was instead the party that made the largest use of multiple candidacies: two-thirds of 
LEU candidates in multi-member constituencies ran in just one district, while one-third 
of them were multi-candidates. 
Albeit the party with the lowest number of multi-candidates, FDI is at the same time 
the party with the largest use of ‘extreme’ multiple candidacies. Four of the FDI extreme 
multi-candidates are female candidates, among whom the leader of the party Giorgia 
Meloni. Another well-known – and criticized by the media – instance of extreme multi-
candidacies regards the outgoing PD minister Maria Elena Boschi, who ran as a candi-
date in Bolzano single-member district and, at the same time, in five multi-member 
constituencies (one in Lombardy, one in Latium and three in Sicily). However, let us un-
derline that the use of extreme multiple candidacies is to be considered as a marginal – 
albeit meaningful – phenomenon, as it regarded at most 2% of the candidates of a party. 
Generally speaking, the most used combination of multiple candidacies is the 1+1 
formula: one-fourth of LEU and M5S candidates, one-fifth of PD candidates, and about 
one-tenth of Forza Italia (FI, Go Italy) and Lega (League, former Northern League) can-
didates appeared at the same time in one single-member district and in one multi-
member constituency. In this regard, it is worth noting that the 1+1 combination was the 
only type of multiple candidacy employed by the M5S in 2018. In particular, the M5S 
used the 1+1 formula for those candidates who were already members of the Italian Par-
liament during the 17th Legislature (52% of M5S multi-candidates were incumbent 
legislators). This presumably indicates an attempt to secure the presence of a group of 
M5S with some legislative experience in the new Parliament. 
The preference of Italian parties for a ‘moderate’ form of multiple candidacy – the 
1+1 formula – suggests a change in party leaders’ strategies from the recent past. In 2018, 
multiple candidacies were used as an instrument for controlling party members only to 
a limited extent. This may of course be related to the fact that, while under the past elec-
toral rules a candidate elected in more than one constituency could choose the 
constituency in which she/he would be proclaimed as winner, the Rosato law no longer 
allows this. If the same candidate is elected in more than one multi-member constitu-
ency, she/he now wins the seat in the constituency where her/his party has obtained the 
lowest percentage of votes. Moreover, a candidate elected both in a single-member dis-
trict and in one or more multi-member districts automatically wins the seat that was at 
stake in the single-member district. 
In 2018, multiple candidacies have been used mostly as a ‘parachute’ for prominent 
– but presumably not so popular – politicians whose success in a single-member district 
was considered uncertain by the party leadership. Among those who lost in their single-
member district but were elected anyway because they were included at the top of their 
party list in (at least) one multi-member constituency, let us recall some ministers of the 
Gentiloni cabinet (Dario Franceschini, Marco Minniti and Roberta Pinotti, from PD), 
the outgoing speakers of the Chamber and Senate (Laura Boldrini and Pietro Grasso, 
LEU), as well as a number of well-known politicians such as Matteo Orfini (PD presi-
dent), Pier Luigi Bersani (formerly PD secretary and currently one of the LEU leaders), 
Mara Carfagna and Stefania Prestigiacomo (former ministers in the centre-right cabi-
nets, FI). At the same time, some particularly appealing candidates have been placed in 
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the party lists of more than one multi-member constituency in order to attract votes in 
certain geographical areas. This is the case of the abovementioned FDI leader Meloni. 
A further element that is worth pointing out with regard to multiple candidacies is 
the rather high number of female candidates among the multi-candidates (above 50%). 
This may also indicate that party leaders have used multiple candidacies in such a way as 
to meet the formal requirements of the Rosato law concerning gender equality in the se-
lection of candidates. Reasonably, the seats left vacant by a woman elected in more than 
one constituency are probably assigned to a male candidate placed after her in the party 
list. These considerations bring us to one of the topics of the next section. 
5. The profile of Italian candidates: gender, age and 
past experience 
The present section deals with three key traits of the candidates running for office in 
2018: their age, gender and past experience as candidates. Throughout the article we 
have presumed that the new electoral rules give extensive powers to party leaders in the 
selection of candidates. What kind of candidate, then, has been selected? As discussed 
in the second section of this article, the Rosato law includes a number of provisions 
aimed at balancing the presence of men and women in the lists that participate in the 
general elections as well as in the Italian Parliament.8 Has the presence of women grown 
among elected politicians? In addition, the topic of the renewal of Italian politics has 
been around for a long time in the public debate. How old is the minority that actively 
participates in Italian general elections? How many of the Italian candidates of 2018 are 
really new to politics?  
Starting with the Italian candidates’ gender, Figure 2 shows the percentage of 
women among candidates for the Chamber and among elected deputies from 1976 to 
2018. As illustrated by the solid black line, in four decades the percentage of female can-
didates has increased fourfold. While in the 1976 elections just 12% of Italian would-be 
deputies were women, in March 2018 women were 44% of the total pool of candidates for 
the Chamber. Let us note that the proportion of female candidates gradually grew until 
1992, but subsequently decreased in the 1994-2001 period under the mixed member sys-
tem established by the Mattarella law. This system forced party leaders to coordinate and 
to accurately choose the candidates (one for each pre-electoral coalition) to be presented 
in the plurality districts. This reduced the percentage of women candidates, especially in 
single-member districts. For instance, in 1994 female candidates made up 45% of the 
candidates in multi-member constituencies, but just 8% of the candidates in single-
member districts. The percentage of female candidates started to grow again in 2006, 
after the adoption of a PR system, approaching half of the overall number of Italian can-
didates under the Rosato law. 
Although the Rosato law has broadly balanced the presence of males and females 
among Italian candidates, things are substantially different if we look at the presence of 
women in the Italian Parliament. The dotted line in Figure 2 shows a general growth in the 
percentage of female deputies after 1976: the percentage of women elected in the Chamber 
                                                             
8 See Norris (1985, 2004) for analyses of the composition of political elites in terms of gender in contem-
porary democracies. 
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in 2018 is three times that observed forty years ago. However, in 2018 the percentage of 
women among elected deputies is just 36%, which is well below the percentage of female 
candidates (44%). Whereas up until 2013 the percentage of female deputies was close to the 
percentage of female candidates (and indeed the former was greater than the latter in the 
2006-2013 period), in 2018 the two have become distant from each other. In other terms, 
the increase in the percentage of female candidates artificially produced by the Rosato law 
has not been paralleled by a similar increase in the percentage of female deputies. 
Figure 2. Percentage of women among candidates and elected deputies, 1976-2018 
 
Notes: Data cover only candidates for the Chamber of Deputies. Multiple candidacies are counted just once. Italian can-
didates running in the abroad constituency and deputies elected in the abroad constituency are excluded. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration using data taken from the website of the Ministry of Interior. 
This adds to a couple of elements that we have discussed above. One is the ‘gender 
penalty’ that seems to affect female candidates in single-member districts (Herrnsson 
et al. 2003), as happened in Italy under the mixed system employed during the 1994-
2001 period. The other is the high number of female candidates among the multi-candi-
dates in 2018. The seats left vacant by elected women are presumably assigned to male 
candidates from the same party. These considerations imply that formal rules are not 
enough to grant a more equal representation of men and women in Parliament. Probably 
only party leaders’ choices concerning the selection of candidates could definitely re-
duce the representation gap between genders. 
With regard to Italian candidates’ age, Table 4 reports the median value calculated 
in each election since 1994 for the entire population of candidates for the Chamber of 
Deputies. As the data for the last 25 years demonstrate, we cannot detect a specific his-
torical trend. In spite of the shift from the First to the Second Republic (and for some 
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observers even to a Third Republic), the almost complete restructuring of the party sys-
tem and the reorganization of electoral supply, and the success of new political 
formations such as the M5S, the median age of Italian candidates in the 2018 election is 
47, which is indeed two years older than the median age of those who aspired to a seat in 
the Chamber in 1992. The lowest value in the 1992-2018 period was observed in 2013 (44 
years) and was mainly due to the young age of M5S candidates: only individuals with no 
previous parliamentary experience could be included in the M5S lists. The overall in-
crease in the median age of Italian candidates from 44 to 47 may then depend on a ‘cohort 
effect’, as at least part of the ‘freshmen’ who made their first appearance in an electoral 
list in 2013 stood again for office in 2018. 
Table 4. Median age of Italian candidates, over time 
Year of election Age (median) 
1992 45 
1994 46 
1996 46 
2001 48 
2006 47 
2008 45 
2013 44 
2018 47 
Notes: Data cover only candidates for the Chamber of Deputies. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration using data taken from the website of the Ministry of Interior. 
Another factor is crucial in understanding the extent of renewal in the population 
of Italian candidates: the proportion of those with some past experience as a candidate. 
In this regard, Figure 3 displays two relevant pieces of data: the percentage of candidates 
for the Chamber who ran as candidates in the past election (the solid line), and the per-
centage of candidates for the Chamber who have run as candidates at least once since 
1976 (the dashed line). The two indicators follow the same trend. In particular, a cautious 
renewal of Italian candidates seems to have been in place towards the end of the First 
Republic. The adoption of a mixed electoral system in 1994 (with a lower number of avail-
able posts in the party lists) forced party leaders to make hard choices between potential 
candidates, which brought about an increase in the fraction of candidates with some past 
experience. Under the Calderoli law, the number of available posts in the party lists in-
creased again, leading to particularly low percentages of would-be deputies with past 
experience as candidates. An actual renewal of the population of Italian candidates took 
place in 2013, when several parties selected their candidates through primary elections. 
As a result, just 13% of the 2013 candidates had some past experience as candidates, and 
only 7% had run in 2008. The renewal rate shrank again in 2018: about one-fifth of the 
2018 candidates had participated in at least one election in the past, and 13% of them had 
stood as a candidate in 2013. This may be related to a mix of factors: the smaller number 
of posts available in the party lists under the Rosato law, the above-mentioned decision 
of the M5S to rely on a cohort of experienced parliamentarians, and the very limited use 
of party primaries before the 2018 elections.  
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Figure 3. Candidates with past experience as candidates, 1979-2018 
 
Notes: Data cover only candidates to the Chamber of Deputies. In the case of the 1979 elections the two indicators 
present the same values because both of them were calculated by comparing 1979 with 1976. No data for candidacies 
are available before the 1976 elections. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration using data taken from the website of the Ministry of Interior. 
6. Concluding remarks 
Studying candidates for public offices provides considerable insights into what can be 
considered as a politically active minority in society, as candidates help to connect citi-
zens with political institutions and determine the profile of representatives. A first 
message that can be drawn from our analysis is the relatively huge size of such an active 
minority in Italy. Despite the fact that the general climate is negative towards politics, 
and politicians’ privileges are harshly stigmatized by the media, there are still many who 
aspire to become part of the ‘casta’ (the ‘clique’) in Italy. For sure, the new electoral sys-
tem – the Rosato law – has reduced the overall number of Italian candidates compared to 
the 2013 elections. However, the new rules have not substantially decreased the number 
of those who run for office without any reasonable possibility of obtaining a parliamen-
tary seat. This seems to suggest that any explanation of candidates’ participation which 
is based on merely institutional factors is insufficient in accounting for the propensity of 
Italian citizens to enter the electoral arena. Let us also note that, compared to the past, 
the pool of Italian would-be representatives has become more balanced in terms of gen-
der, but has not become younger. In addition, the turnover rate among Italian candidates 
seems to be somewhat lower than in 2013. However, it should be noted that the electoral 
earthquake associated with the 2013 and 2018 elections, although similar in magnitude 
to the one registered in 1994, is different when the political personnel turnover is taken 
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into consideration. In1994 and the following elections, voters seemed to have moved, 
while candidates changed only in part. On the contrary, in 2013 and 2018 voters switched 
as candidates changed. 
Candidates, however, do not run as single individuals in the electoral arena, but as 
members of a team. The Rosato law provides party leaders with some powerful instru-
ments for controlling and steering the population of candidates, including the possibility 
of multiple candidacies. This article has shown that, moving from 2013 to 2018, the lead-
ers of Italian parties have made a more moderate use of multiple candidacies as a tool for 
controlling party members. In the last elections, multiple candidacies were mostly em-
ployed for safeguarding the election of some prominent politicians. Our analyses have 
also pointed out that, in spite of the presumably genuine intentions of its proposers, the 
Rosato law has increased the presence of women in the Italian Parliament to a much 
lesser degree than might have been expected. In practice, several provisions of the law 
have been applied by party leaders, whether or not on purpose, in such a way as to penal-
ize female candidates. 
In providing an overview of Italian candidacies in the 2018 elections, this article 
opens up some interesting avenues for future research. A first avenue of investigation 
originates from the need for a better understanding of how the provisions of the Rosato 
law have been applied by different parties, each with a specific organizational structure 
and leaders oriented towards particular aims. Secondly, the degree of renewal of the Ital-
ian Parliament undoubtedly deserves greater attention. To this purpose, the new cohorts 
of candidates should be analysed in depth. Are newcomers different from those candi-
dates who have already run for office or who have already been in Parliament? A further 
avenue for future research is to look at the conduct of candidates once elected. For exam-
ple, candidates elected in plurality districts could be expected to behave differently from 
candidates elected in multi-party constituencies in terms of their loyalty to the party in 
legislative votes, or with regard to the type of legislation they promote, or considering 
how much they engage in constituency service. Hopefully, further answers to these ques-
tions will be provided by new survey data collected from among Italian candidates. 
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